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CANADIAN LEGISLATIVE POWERS
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AND CANADIAN
LEGISLATIVE POWERS
W. P. M. KENNEDYt
In accepting the honour of writing an article for the WASH-
INGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY on some aspect of Canadian
constitutional law, I must presume a good deal of knowledge on
the part of my readers; otherwise, it would be hard to know
where to begin, where to end, what to say, what to omit. For
my immediate purposes it will be sufficient to remember that
Canada is a federation of nine provinces created by the British
North America Act, 1867,1 carrying on its activities in public
and private law under that Act and its amendments, under the
common law (except in Quebec, where the civil law holds sway),
and under the great landmarks of British constitutional law in
so far as not modified or changed by validly enacted federal or
provincial legislation. Legislative powers are divided between
the federal and provincial legislatures in such a way as to ex-
haust the whole field, which is not fenced, as in the United States,
with any constitutional limitations. The doctrine of legislative
supremacy prevails. Granted the power, the manner of its exer-
cise cannot be questioned by any appeals to a bill of rights or to
such refinements of argument as flow for example from "the
privileges and immunities" or "due process of law" clauses in
the American Constitution. Canadian legislative powers are dis-
tributed under the creating Act of 1867. To the provincial legis-
latures are given certain exclusive enumerated powers under
section 92; while, under section 91, the undefined residue belongs
to the federal parliament. For the moment, I need say nothing
in detail; but it is necessary, at this point, to view in a cursory
manner the constitutional evolution of these legislative powers in
order to appreciate the judicial process in relation to them-the
aim and purpose of this survey. I have specially selected this
subject for an American law journal, because federalism and
t W. P. M. Kennedy, M.A., LL.B., Litt.D., Trinity College, Dublin; LL.D.,
University of Montreal. Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. Professor
of Law, University of Toronto.
1. 30 and 31 Viet. c. 3. This Act and its Amendments can be conveni-
ently consulted in Kennedy, Statutes, Treaties and Documents of the Cana-
dian Constitution (1930) 617.
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the judicial process in relation to it are matters of perennial
interest, and their workings in the Canadian jurisdictions are of
creative value in the study of comparative law. On the other
hand, I want to enter a caveat. I do not think that the so-called
study of comparative law is worth much if it does not go far
beyond mere legal analysis and reach the economic and social
life of the particular nation-states concerned. I cannot, then,
obviously, enter into this respect of the subject--which would
occupy a treatise were it given worth-while consideration-and
I must confine myself to an analysis which makes no claim to
be more than a surface-view. The real problems-the social
depths from which the judicial process has issued and the social
consequences-must be matter for another day.
I. ORIGIN AND STATEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE PoOWERS
The immediate preliminaries to the British North America
Act, 1867, are to be found in the conferences of representatives
from the British North American colonies held in Quebec in
1864 and in London in 1866.2 The Quebec Conference drafted a
series of resolutions which met with such a political colonial
reception as to nullify them as a basis for federation. It must
be remembered, however, that, whatever their fate, the general
purpose behind them, in relation to the distribution of legislative
powers, remained unchanged amid all the political difficulties.
The years above noted will give the American student some clue
to the situation, coloured as it was both in sentiment and in
express words by the Civil War. The colonists deliberately aimed
to reverse the American system: to the provinces were to be
allotted exclusive legislative powers over enumerated classes of
matters and to the federation should belong the vast residue of
undefined legislative powers. For better or for worse, this
seemed an obvious lesson from the Civil War to the colonial
statesmen, especially to John A. Macdonald who was the colonial
counterpart to Alexander Hamilton.3 The failure of the Quebec
conference was, fortunately, not irretrievable. A further con-
ference was held in London in 1866, acting with colonial ap-
proval. There the whole scheme was considered de novo, and
2. The Resolutions of both these Conferences are in Kennedy, op. cit.
supra note 1, at pp. 541 ff., 611 if.
3. This point of view can be cursorily examined in W. B. Munro, Amer-
ican Influences on Canadian Government (1929) 3 if.
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sixty-nine resolutions were agreed on as a unanimous basis for
the statutory structure of the new federation: "the sanction of
the Imperial Parliament shall be sought for the union of the
Provinces on the principles adopted by this Conference." If we
keep in mind "the general purpose" already referred to and
flowing from American experience, we shall see that it was never
deviated from. This "general purpose," this governing principle,
is abundantly clear. The London Conference laid it down un-
equivocally:
In the federation of the British North American Provinces,
the system of government best adapted * * * to protect the
diversified interests of the several Provinces and secure
efficiency, harmony and permanency in the working of the
Union is a general government charged with matters of
common interest to the whole country and local govern-
ments [for the Provinces] charged with the control of local
matters in their respective sections.
The London Resolutions were forwarded to the Colonial Secre-
tary with a request for legislation based on their express terms.
The London Resolutions contained an enumeration of provin-
cial legislative subject-matters (Resolution 41)-a necessary
process based on "the general purpose," "the governing princi-
ple." These the draftsman, Lord Thring, one of the greatest in
history, turned into section 92 of the British North America Act.
They became exclusive to the provinces for the simple reason
that the London Conference desired the provinces to have "con-
trol of local matters." Again, the London Resolutions (Resolu-
tion 28) assigned to the federal legislature "power to make laws
for the peace, welfare and good government of the federation
* * * and especially laws respecting the following subjects." Here
followed thirty-six enumerated subject-matters of which the last
read: "And generally respecting all matters of a general char-
acter, not specially and exclusively reserved for the local legis-
latures." Now, it is a matter of historical record that section 92
of the Act was drafted first; and, as Lord Thring approached
the drafting of section 91 (the federal legislative powers), all
that he strictly needed to do was to state that the federal legis-
lature had power to legislate on all subject-matters not assigned
exclusively by enumeration to the province. This, in fact, he
did; and the clause would have been sufficient to distribute the
powers. However, Resolution 28 confronted him, demanding its
1940]
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expression in statutory form. He did not, and could not, include
its enumerated heads in section 91 as further powers, because
Resolution 28 had referred to them as "especially" subject-mat-
ters illustrative of the general residuary power given to the
federal legislature. In sections 92 and 91, which were amply
and carefully founded on Resolutions 41 and 28 of the London
Conference, provincial powers were enumerated and exclusive,
while federal powers were the residuum, with illustrations. The
whole range of legislative powers within the new Dominion was
exhausted by the distribution.4
Sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act run as
follows:
VI. Distribution of Legislative Powers
Powers of the Parliament
91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make
Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada,
in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of
Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures
of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to
restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Sec-
tion, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything
in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Par-
liament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the
Classes of Subjects next herein-after enumerated; that is
to say,-
1. The Public Debt and Property.
2. The Regulation of Trade and Commerce.
3. The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxa-
tion.
4. The borrowing of Money on the Public Credit.
5. Postal Service.
6. The Census and Statistics.
7. Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence.
8. The fixing of and providing for the Salaries and Allow-
ances of Civil and other Officers of the Government of
Canada..
4. "The Federation Act exhausts the whole range of legislative power
* * * whatever is not thereby given to the provincial legislatures rests
with the [federal] parliament." Lord Hobhouse, in Bank of Toronto v.
Lambe (1887) 12 App. Cas. 575, 588. "Now, there can be no doubt that
* * * the powers distributed between the Dominion on the one hand and
the provinces on the other hand cover the whole area of self-government
within the whole area of Canada." Lord Loveburn L. C., in Attorney-
General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada [1912] A. C. 571, 581.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss2/3
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9. Beacons, Buoys, Lighthouses, and Sable Island.
10. Navigation and Shipping.
11. Quarantine and Establishment and Maintenance of
Marine Hospitals.
12. Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries.
13. Ferries between a Province and any British or Foreign
Country or between Two Provinces.
14. Currency and Coinage.
15. Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper
Money.
16. Savings Banks.
17. Weights and Measures.
18. Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes.
19. Interest.
20. Legal Tender.
21. Bankruptcy and Insolvency.
22. Patents of Invention and Discovery.
23. Copyrights.
24. Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.
25. Naturalization and Aliens.
26. Marriage and Divorce.
27. The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts
of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure
in Criminal Matters.
28. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of
Penitentiaries.
29. Such Classes of Subjects as are expressly excepted in
the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act
assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.
And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Sub-
jects enumerated in this Section shall not be deemed to come
within the Class of Matters of a local or private Nature
comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by
this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the
Provinces.
Exclusive Powers of Provincial Legislatures
92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make
Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of
Subjects next herein-after enumerated; that is to say,-
1. The Amendment from Time to Time, notwithstanding
anything in this Act, of the Constitution of the Province,
except as regards the Office of Lieutenant-Governor.
2. Direct Taxation within the Province in order to the
Raising of a Revenue for Provincial Purposes.
3. The borrowing of Money on the Sole Credit of the
Province.
1940]
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4. The Establishment and Tenure of Provincial Offices and
the Appointment and Payment of Provincial Officers.
5. The Management and Sale of the Public Lands belonging
to the Province and of the Timber and Wood thereon.
6. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of
Public and Reformatory Prisons in and for the Province.
7. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of
Hospitals, Asylums, Charities, and Eleemosynary In-
stitutions in and for the Province, other than Marine
Hospitals.
8. Municipal Institutions in the Province.
9. Shop, Saloon, Tavern, Auctioneer, and other Licenses in
order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial, Local,
or Municipal Purposes.
10. Local Work and Undertakings other than such as are of
the following Classes:-
a. Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals,
Telegraphs, and.other Works and Undertakings con-
necting the Province with any other or others of the
Provinces, or extending beyond the Limits of the
Province:
b. Lines of Steam Ships between the Province and any
British or Foreign Country:
c. Such Works as, although wholly situate within the
Province, are before or after their Execution de-
clared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the
general Advantage of Canada or for the Advantage
of Two or more of the Provinces.
11. The Incorporation of Companies with Provincial Ob-
jects.
12. The Solemnization of Marriage in the Province.
13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province.
14. The Administration of Justice in the Province, includ-
ing the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of
Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal Juris-
diction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in
those Courts.
15. The Imposition of Punishment by Fine, Penalty, or Im-
prisonment for enforcing any Law of the Province made
in relation to any Matter coming within any of the
Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section.
16. Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Na-
ture in the Province.
Now, before leaving this division of the subject it is well to
quote the words of Lord Carnarvon, the Minister in charge of
the Act, speaking, on its introduction, both for the British gov-
ernment and for the unanimous colonial delegates:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss2/3
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The real object which we have in view is to give to the
central government those high functions and almost sover-
eign powers by which general principles and uniformity of
legislation may be secured in those questions that are of
common import to all the provinces; and, at the same time
to retain for each province * * * ample * * * measure of
municipal liberty and self-government * * *. I ought to
point out that * * * the residue of legislation, if any, un-
provided for in the specific classification * * * will belong
to the central body. It will be seen under the 91st clause
that the classification is not intended to "restrict the gener-
ality" of the powers previously given to the central parlia-
ment, and that those powers extend to all laws made "for
the peace, order and good government" of the federation.5
To sum up:
1. The British North America Act, in the distribution of
legislative powers, amply carried out both in spirit and
in terms the Resolutions of the London Conference.
2. The opening words of section 91 ("It shall be lawful * * *
legislatures of the provinces") are undoubtedly the enact-
ing words.
3. The words following in section 91, next in order after
the "opening words," are not enacting, but declaratory.
4. The twenty-seven enumerated classes of subjects in sec-
tion 91 are set down "for greater certainty" of "the fore-
going terms," and they must not be used "to restrict the
generality" of these terms.
5. The final words of the section ("And any matter * *
undoubtedly refer, as a matter of construction, to pkaci-
turn 16 of Section 92.
Thus, to borrow the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, I have
attempted up to this point to regard rather "the constitution it-
self and not what we have said about it."" The federal powers
are wholly residuary for the simple reason that the provincial
powers are exclusive; and the twenty-seven "enumerations" in
Section 91 cannot add to the residue; they cannot take away
from it. They are there, as I have pointed out, to satisfy the
London Resolutions (No. 28). They have no meaning except as
examples of the residuary power, which must be as exclusive
as is the grant of legislative powers to the provinces. The enu-
merated examples of the residuary power cannot occupy any
5. This speech is given in extenso in 3 Hardinge, The Fourth Earl of
Carwnarvon (1925) 305.
6. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe (1939) 306 U. S. 466, 491.
1940]
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special place; they cannot be exalted at the expense of the resid-
uary power, for that would "restrict the generality" of that
power. It all looks reasonably simple, and John A. Macdonald
was perhaps justified as he looked at the scheme in hoping that
"all conflict of jurisdiction ' had been avoided.
Thus, we have a scheme of the distribution of legislative
powers, which, in its terms, gives local matters to the provinces
-we note how every provincial class of subjects is carefully
qualified as "of the province," or "in the province," or "for
provincial purposes"--with an undefined residue to the federal
legislature. In other words, classes of subjects of a Canadian
nature---"common to all the provinces'--are federal, while to
the provinces belong certain enumerated and local matters. No
field of law is distributed; each authority is given powers "in
relation to matters." It is obvious that on construction some
provincial matters may assume a national aspect, and that the
judicial process must then be called in aid to resolve the problem
of the legislative jurisdiction, when a statute in relation to some
"matter" is in dispute.
II. THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
First of all, we must recall that the final interpretation of the
British North America Act, 1867, lies at present with the Judi-
cial Committee of the Privy Council. This is not the place to
discuss the reasons which lie behind this exercise of jurisdic-
tion. They are historical, emotional, and unfortunately largely
professional. It is sufficient to say that, since the depression
which has disclosed the woeful inadequacy of the constitutional
law, there has been a growing demand to curb and control this
procedure, and there can be no doubt that it will disappear in
due course.8 My readers, however, will know something of legal
conservatism and the difficulties which surround proposals for
change in long established legal institutions.
Secondly, we must recall that the British North America Act
is a statute, and the Judicial Committee have uniformly pro-
fessed to apply to it that strange, indefinite, unreliable and
7. Kennedy, op. cit. supra note 1, at 559.
8. See some discussion of this point in Kennedy, Essays in Constitutional
Law (1934) passim; and Kennedy, The Development, Law and Custom of
the Canadian Constitution (2d ed. 1938) 525; and in The Round Table
(September, 1939) 839 ff., where the most recent aspects of the subject
are discussed.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss2/3
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wholly obscure bundle of processes, inaccurately called "rules
of statutory interpretation."9 As a consequence, the Judicial
Committee has paid lip service to the Quebec Conference and
Resolutions of 1864-an extraordinary procedure seeing that the
London Resolutions of 1866, the very existence of which the
Judicial Committee has been completely ignorant,10 are alone
worthy of consideration. But not once has the ratio decidendi
turned on the study of external aids such as conferences, reso-
lutions, parliamentary discussions, economic or social facts. Stu-
dents of American constitutional law will, at once, recognize the
differences between the judicial process in the Supreme Court
of the United States and in the Judicial Committee. In only one
case do we find any attempt to construe the statute as "a con-
stitution"-Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada4-where,
in 1930, the Lord Chancellor laid it down that the Judicial Com-
mittee has no desire to narrow the provisions of the Act by a
technical construction, but were prepared to give them the large
and liberal interpretation of a constitution. His Lordship, how-
ever, was careful to point out that this process was not to be
applied to the distribution of legislative powers-the central
problem. And so the Edwards case left these where they had
always been-sections of a statute subject to the "rules" of
statutory interpretation. It is true that Lord Sankey quoted
'himself, speaking in the Edwards case, in 1935 in British Coal
Corporation v. The King,'2 without this caveat. The quotation
from the Edwards case, however, has nothing whatever to do
°with the ratio decidendi in the British Coal Corporation case.
Indeed, Lord Sankey's attempt-if such it be-to depart from
the traditional methods called for severe professional disap-
proval such as that expressed in 1937, by McGillivray, J. A., in
a learned judgment:
It seems to me that none of the observations of Viscount
9. Cf. Lord Hobhouse in Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887) 12 App. Cas.
575, 587.
10. During the argument in Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider
[19251 A. C. 396, Lord Haldane agreed with counsel that there was no
conference after that at Quebec in 1864. He pointed out subsequently in
Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King [1921] 2 A. C. 91, 116, that "as
matter of historical curiosity" the Quebec Resolutions of 1864 were drawn
up to guide "the Imperial Parliament in enacting the Constitution of
1867." It is certainly an "historical curiosity."
11. [1930] A. C. 124, especially at 136-137.
12. [1935) A. C. 500, 518, 519.
1940]
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Sankey can be said to provide legal justification for an at-
tempt by Canadian Courts to mould and fashion the Cana-
dian Constitution by judicial legislation so as to make it
conform according to their views to the requirements of
present day social and economic conditions. 13
Lord Sankey, also, once quoted the parliamentary debates-Lord
Carnarvon's speech already referred to-but the example is iso-
lated; and His Lordship was careful, neither by punctuation nor
reference, to reveal the quotation. So we can conclude that, as
the British North America Act is a statute, a statute it re-
mains.14
We have already pointed out that there need have been no
great difficulties in this connexion. The Judicial Committee had
only one fundamental function, with the Act in front of them
and even with the "rules" of statutory interpretation binding
on them. Their duty was to take section 91 and section 92 and
apply their necessary terms when a statute, provincial or federal,
came before them. They had merely to ascertain to the best of
their ability to what class in either section the legislation, in its
pith and substance, belonged ("the coming within" of the Act).
There were evidently no vast difficulties other than those inher-
ent in the interpretation process; and, as we have seen, the Act
itself is remarkably clear. Indeed, it worked well for a genera-
tion. Here we must try to trace a judicial process almost unique
in its evolution not merely for its social consequences-with
which I am not here largely concerned, although they are indeed
the only vital issues-but for its interest to legal students. It is
obvious that, in a study such as this, I can make no pretence
to be inclusive or to go into the minutiae of the judgments. My
purpose will be fulfilled if I illustrate the processes and sum up
the conclusions derived from them. I feel more easy in my mind
about this when I remember that American students need not
fear the burden of themselves examining the cases, as they can
do so with great convenience in consolidated form ;" and they
13. Kazakewich v. Kazakewich [1937] 1 D. L. R. 548, 567 (Alberta).
Cf. G. F. Henderson, Eligibility of Women for the Senate (1929) Can. Bar
Rev. 617.
14. Lord Sankey, L. C., in In re The Regulation and Control of Aero-
nautics in Canada [1932] A. C. 54, 70, 71 (the passage beginning "It must
no less" etc., which is almost word for word from Lord Carnarvon's speech
already set out). See Kennedy, Essays in Constitutional Law (1934) 167.
15. The Canadian constitutional cases before the Judicial Committee
from 1867 to 1939 are issued (under the editorship of Mr. E. R. Cameron
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss2/3
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are few in number (scarcely two hundred) -a mere detail, when
I think of the vast array of American constitutional cases which
I have been compelled to read.
For over twenty years the Act worked admirably in that the
judicial processes of interpretation could be reasonably related
to its terms. In 1874, in L'Union St. Jacques v. B6lisle,16 Lord
Selborne was as clear as possible about the relationship of sec-
tions 91 and 92; and he was equally clear that the concluding
words of section 91 is to restrict the scope of placitum 16 of
section 92. In the following year in Dow v. Black,17 in 1879
in Valin v. Langlois,18 in 1880 in Cushing v. Dupuy,19 and in
1881 in the Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons,20 we see at work
a reasonable judicial process. I would, however, like to point
out that, in the Parsons case, Sir Montague Smith made certain
observations of little importance to the parties to the case but
of great importance years on. He glanced at, to put it mildly,
a kind of subtle dichotomy between the residual power of the
Dominion and the illustrations of it in section 91 ;21 and he
introduced an error of construction of a destructive nature in
the future. He said:
With the same object [as that of the declaratory provision-
what he called 'the second branch' of section 91] appar-
ently the paragraph at the end of section 91 was introduced,
though it may be observed that this paragraph applies in its
grammatical construction only to No. 16 of section 92.22
The statement was dangerous in the extreme; neither the clear
grammar nor intent of the Act has prevented most serious con-
sequences. However, at the moment the Parsons case did no
harm. It is full of many loose phrases, but its sinister influence
was not yet felt.
In 1882, came Russell v. The Queen23 (explained and followed,
in 1883, in Hodge v. The Queen) with a reasonable and clear-
and Mr. C. P. Plaxton) in three volumes by the King's Printer, Ottawa.
The judgments, etc., are printed in extenso, are carefully referenced to the
law reports, and are admirably and minutely cross-referenced.
16. (1874) L. R. 6 P. C. 31.
17. (1875) L. R. 6 P. C. 272.
18. (1879) 5 App. Cas. 115.
19. (1880) 5 App. Cas. 409.
20. (1881) 7 App. Cas. 96.
21. 7 App. Cas. at 107, 108.
22. 7 App. Cas. at 108.
23. (1882) 7 App. Cas. 829.
24. (1883) 9 App. Cas. 117.
19401
Washington University Open Scholarship
226 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25
cut decision fully in accord with the intent of the Act. "The
principle which [Russell v. The Queen] and the case of the
Citizens Insurance Company illustrates is, that subjects which
in one aspect and for one purpose fall within section 92, may
in another aspect and for another purpose fall within section
91.1'25 Thus, for many years we see that the judicial process
was in keeping with the intent and terms of the Act. Matters
of a national interest common to all the provinces have not been
withdrawn from federal legislative competence, and matters "of
a merely local or private nature" in a province are assigned to
the exclusive legislative competence of the province, subject to
the final words ("And any * * * provinces") of section 91.
In 1894, began the real serious decline in sound interpreta-
tion; and from this date we must summarize, if this survey is
to be kept within reasonable bounds. In that year, in Tennant v.
Union Bank,26 first of all, Lord Watson misquoted the Act ("shall
extend" for "extends"). Secondly, the Act gives the federal
legislature power to make laws "in relation to" matters and says
nothing about the exercise of this power as conditioned by a
necessity that it shall not "interfere with," "trench upon" (as
his Lordship says) matters under provincial legislative author-
ity. Thirdly, his Lordship definitely broke up the federal legis-
lative authority into two parts: (1) the general power; (2)
"and also" enumerated subjects. In other words, where the Act
provides the enumerated subjects of section 91 as examples of
the federal residual power, his Lordship makes them an addi-
tion ("and also") to the general power. We shall see how this
third error led to one more absurd. By this division he arrived
at the conclusion that "the exclusive legislative authority of the
Parliament of Canada shall extend to all matters coming within
the enumerated classes; which plainly indicates that the legis-
lation of that Parliament, so long as it strictly relates to these
matters, is to be of paramount authority."27 Here we have mis-
quotation, and we have the Dominion's one and only power-
the residue of legislative powers-made subject to enumerations
which are not separate classes of matters, but flow from and
depend on the residuary grant itself. The case is of vital im-
25. 9 App. Cas. at 130.
26. [1894] A. C. 31. See especially Lord Watson at 45, 46, 47.
27. Id. at 45.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss2/3
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portance because it established a more or less fatal line of de-
cisions.
In 1896, came Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-
General for Cana&a (commonly known as the Prohibition
case28 ). Once more Lord Watson gives the decision of the Judi-
cial Committee. Here we see something newer still. He had
added the enumerated powers of section 91 to the power to
legislate for "the peace order and good government of Canada"
in the Tennant case; now he adds the latter to the former ("The
general power * * * in supplement of its enumerated powers" 29).
These enumerated powers are erected with a class by themselves,
and the so-called federal "general power" (on which the enumer-
ations depend and which is the sole federal power) now becomes
a power only to be exercised in matters which are unquestion-
ably of national interest and importance.30 All this is extraordi-
nary; but it did not stop there. The loose language of the Parsons
case is now relied on to make the concluding words of section
91 refer to "all the matters enumerated in the sixteen heads of
s. 92" and not to placitum 16 alone of section 92.31 So that we
have now arrived at the position in which the federal residuary
power-its sole and only power in the Act-is subjected to statu-
tory examples of that power; while, in addition, Lord Watson
set himself on record that the Judicial Committee must protect,
guard, preserve the autonomy of the provinces.3 Of course, as
the Judicial Committee has interpreted the Act, consequences of
a serious nature might result; but itsterms, properly read and
reasonably applied, would prevent any such situation. After a
quarter of a century of the judicial process on the terms of the
Act, we now find by 1896 a situation where: (1) the enumerated
placita of section 91 are divorced from the introductory words
on which they undoubtedly depend; (2) the enumerated placita
of section 91 are given an exclusiveness by the concluding words
of the section and not by the prior non obstante clause; (3) the
concluding words of section 91, in clear terms and intent a limit-
ing power on the provincial power in placitum 16 of section 92,
become, by application to all the placita of section 92, a limita-
28. r1896J A. C. 348.
29. Id. at 361.
30. Id. at 360.
31. Id. at 359.
32. Id. at 361.
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tion on the scope of the federal enacting authority; (4) the
federal power to legislate for the "peace order and good govern-
ment" of Canada-its sole power, the residuary power-is
erected into a separate power and reduced to a position of exer-
cise only in some extraordinary cases and that without any ex-
clusiveness or paramountcy as provided for in the Act.
What remains to be said is just the history of those four ele-
ments in the judicial process, summed up in 1929 in four proposi-
tions by Lord Tomlin which are utterly indefensible in terms
of the Act, and only of value in canalizing the years of the
erroneous judicial process.38 For a moment, in 1921, Lord
Birkenhead saw the light and got the terms of the Act clear-
back to before 1896 ;34 but the light failed, and Lord Tomlin's
propositions remain to control-governed, not by the terms of
the Act, but by Lord Watson's perversions of it and by ampli-
fications of the same. Once only has the Judicial Committee actu-
ally protested against the situation, in Proprietary Articles
Trade Association v. Attorney General for Canada, in 1931;35
but Lord Atkin in that case is speaking obiter and his words
have had no effect. In the Board of Commerce case" in 1922,
in the Newsprint Control case3" in 1923, in the Snider case38 in
1925, in the Weekly Rest case of 193739 we see the errors of
1896 at work. Indeed the Snider case (followed in the Weekly
Rest case) is almost pathetic. We have today arrived at a posi-
tion (1) where in fact the residue of legislative powers has
passed to the provinces under "property and civil rights ;" (2)
where the normal and usual powers of the federal legislature
are those under the enumerated placita of section 91 (except
33. Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for British Colum-
bia [1930] A. C. 111, 118. So strong have these four summaries become-
in spite of their erroneous statements in the light of the terms of the Act,
but flowing from the initial errors of the preceding years-that they were
approved in In re Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada [1932]
A. C. 54, 71-72; and in In re Silver Brothers [1932] A. C. 514, 520-521.
34. Canadian Pacific Wine Co. v. Tuley [1921] 2 A. C. 417, 422-423.
("It was contended * * * description.")
35. [1931] A. C. 310, 326 ("The view that *** that ground.")
36. In re The Board of Commerce Act, 1919, and The Combines and
Fair Prices Act, 1919 [1922] 1 A. C. 191.
37. Fort Francis Pulp and Paper Co. v. Manitoba Free Press Co. [1923]
A. C. 695.
38. Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider [1925] A. C. 396.
39. Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario [1937]
A. C. 326.
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that the power over "the regulation of trade and commerce" is
in the absurd position of being a power which the federation
can only call in aid of a power granted elsewhere4 ) ; (3) where
the so-called "general" federal power (in truth in terms of the
Act, its only power) can only be employed by the federal legis-
lature in times of pestilence, famine or some extraordinary na-
tional peril; (4) where the Act is regularly misquoted.42
As I have already indicated, it lies beyond the ambit and scope
of this study to examine in any adequate way the reasons be-
hind the judicial process which I have surveyed. From the very
beginning of federation we have had "centralists" and "provin-
cialists", "federalists" and "state-righters", and it may have
been that the former, who enjoyed political power at Ottawa
for almost the first quarter of a century after 1867, were in-
clined to be arrogant and exacting in relation to the provinces.
In addition, we have had no Civil War, and the initial "state-
rights" position, fortified by race, religion, and economic regions
has been against national cohesion. It would almost seem that
the Judicial Committee has not been entirely free from guile,
and suggestions have not been wanting by men of position and
judgment that the Judicial Committee once took a political view
and feared that the provinces might be hurt, and that that view,
implicitly influencing its judgments, has now become a some-
what rigid aspect of stare decisis. Moreover, political federal
parties are organized on a provincial basis; and this organiza-
tion minimizes protests and the development of judicial reform.
These points are mere suggestions, and there remain to be ex-
amined by some competent student the reasons behind the judi-
cial process. For myself, in this connexion, I could only write
40. This federal power over "the regulation of trade and commerce" is
the one which, obiter, Lord Atkin would have rescued from the inferior
position assigned to it (See Proprietary Articles Trade Ass'n v. Attorney
General for Canada [1931] A. C. 310.) Unfortunately the Judicial Com-
mittee has refused to supplement this obiter dictum, and the power is regu-
lated by the judicial process to a position utterly impossible to defend on
the clear terms of the Act, and one which makes it barren and useless.
41. For extraordinary examples of using "affecting" for "in relation
to"-the words of the Act-see the cases (passim) on the Canadian social
legislation reported in [1937] A. C. Every lawyer can at once appreciate
the vital importance of this error. On this point, see Kennedy, Constitu-
tion of Canada (1922) 551-52, and House of Commons Debates, Ottawa
(April 5, 1937) 2773 ff.; and for a survey of these judgments, see (1937)
15 Can. Bar Rev. 393-507.
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as the merest amateur; and it is little good attempting to ex-
plain through inexpert ways and means.
We can easily see from this survey how hampered and tied
the federal legislature has become, how narrowed are its powers,
how circumscribed its authority-and all this quite unneces-
sarily so. Even in these days of international and economic de-
pression, Canada is unable to meet services which are in truth
national--old age pensions, minimum-wage laws, hours of labour,
unemployment insurance, in a word all the vast demands of
social legislation-but which, by unfortunate and unaccountable
interpretation of the British North America Act, are given to
the provinces under "property and civil rights.142 With a rigid
constitution-almost impossible to change because of the politi-
cal powers of the provinces accentuated by the Privy Council
decisions--and with the clear terms of the Act so obscured and
twisted and misquoted in favour of the provinces, we have
reached a position in which federalism, difficult at any time and
specially difficult in Canada owing to racial, religious, economic
and linguistic divisions and groupings, becomes a source of na-
tional weakness. Provincial rights have become national wrongs.
Of the future, I cannot write here. On all sides, however, we
are at last turning to a serious consideration of the issues in
constitutional law, and for the first time in our history the primi-
tive ancestor-worship for long bestowed on the British North
America Act is giving place to profound questionings and deep
misgivings. To the legal student this is of great importance, as
we now watch social forces-the life behind the law-biting
into the recalcitrant material of entrenched provincial claims
fortified by the judicial process. To explain that process-to give
reasons for it-is well-nigh impossible; but at any rate, we
shall arrive better through the pressure of life itself at more
enduring reforms than if we had reached them through doc-
trinaire or logical methods. Once again in legal history we are
venturing to hope that the life of the law will be through ex-
perience. It may be that, in the end, the very judicial processes
which we have examined, which are simply inexplicable, and
through which the raison c'gtre itself of the British North
America Act has been completely overturned and the method of
42. In this connexion, see an important article by Brooke Claxton, "Social
Reform and the Constitution" (1935) 1 Can. J. of Econ. and Poli. Sci. 409.
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distribution of legislative powers reversed, will lead to a more
realistic and more socially beneficial jurisprudence than we
might have obtained even had the plain terms of the Act been
applied. At the moment, however, I may well conclude this
article by remarking that Solomon would have included the
judicial process which I have sketched-with those of an eagle
in the air, of a serpent upon a rock, of a ship in the midst of
the sea, of a man with a maid-as totally beyond even his knowl-
edge or comprehension.
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